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Financial Modernization: What's in It for
Communities?
Lawrence J. White
INTRODUCTION
"Financial modernization" is often used as a pair of code
words for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley ("GLB") Act, which was signed
into law on November 12, 1999. Though the GLB Act will hasten the
processes of financial consolidation and modernization modestly,
those processes have been going on for the past few decades and
surely would have continued even in the absence of GLB. Thus, GLB
is only a part of the full sweep of financial modernization.
In this essay I will offer some thoughts about the
consequences of financial modernization, both broadly considered and
specifically in the guise of the GLB Act, for communities and their
residents. Section I will review briefly the relative magnitudes of
important components of the financial services sector, and some
recent and longer-term trends. Section II will discuss the reasons for
these trends. Section III will address the consequences for
communities. Section IV will specifically address the Community
Reinvestment Act ("CRA"). And then, I will offer a brief conclusion.
I. THE COMPONENTS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
SECTOR: SIZES, NUMBERS, AND TRENDS
Table 1 presents data on the asset sizes,' in billions of dollars,
of the major components or sub-sectors of the financial services
sector, as of the end of the calendar year 1999, which approximates
*Lawrence J. White is the Arthur E. Impertore Professor of Economics at the
Stem School of Business, New York University. During 1986-1989 he was a board
member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. This paper is adapted from oral remarks
made at the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights Symposium, "Financial
Modernization: The Effects of the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act on Communities and
Consumers," March 28, 2000.
1 For comparison purposes, the 1999 value of the U.S. GDP - a flow - is
placed a the bottom of the table.
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the date of the passage of the GLB Act. Table 2 presents data on the
numbers of enterprises in many of these sub-sectors. Table 3 portrays
some important recent trends. The data are drawn from an amalgam
of sources: government regulatory agencies, government statistical
agencies, and trade associations.
As Table 1 indicates, the dollar magnitudes of these
components are large. 2  The commercial banks, on which a
considerable amount of public attention and regulatory effort is focused,
accounted for almost five and a half trillion dollars at year-end 1999.
But commercial banks were not the only sizable financial sub-sector.
Other notable sectors included: savings institutions and credit unions,
with over one and a half billion dollars in assets; insurance companies,
with over four billion dollars in assets; mutual funds, with almost seven
billion dollars; and pension funds, with over eight billion dollars.
Finance companies and trade credit, often under-appreciated as sources
of financing, totaled almost three billion dollars in assets. And the
stock market, which attracted a considerable amount of attention in the
1990s, had an aggregate value of almost nineteen billion dollars.
Turning to Table 2, we see that there were tens of thousands of
enterprises offering various financial services. The number of
separately chartered commercial banks alone numbered 8,580, although
the existence of bank holding companies reduced the number of bank
organizations to about 6,600. In addition, there were over 12,600
savings institutions and credit unions, about 3,600 insurance companies,
over 400 mutual fund companies that offered almost 8,000 funds, and
about 7,700 securities firms. Despite the widespread attention given to
the stock market, it is worth noting that only about 10,000 enterprises
(out of about 22 million enterprises in the U.S.) were listed and traded.
Finally in Table 3 we see some important trends for banking.
The financial services sector has been growing in relative importance;
banks have been becoming fewer, larger, and healthier; banking has
become more global; there has been reduced regulation and increased
competition; there is more electronic banking, especially at the bank-
2 The asset figures of Table I include some double counting; for example, the
assets of banks include bond securities and mortgage backed securities; the assets of
pension funds include mutual funds; the assets of mutual funds include stocks and bonds;
etc.
116
LAWRENCE WHITE 1
to-bank "wholesale" level; but electronic banking has been slow to
penetrate retail banking, as evidenced by the large number of checks
that continue to be written every year (which contrasts with the rapid
rise of the Internet for securities trading); and there has been a long-
term decline in the relative importance of commercial banks within
the financial sector.
We now turn to some explanations for these trends.
II. EXPLAINING THE TRENDS
A. Some History
A larger historical background on the financial services sector
will provide a useful context for how and why the trends of the past
few decades came to be.3
Traditionally, the U.S. financial services sector tended to be
compartmentalized: banks did bankirig (i.e., accepted deposits and
made loans); insurance companies underwrote and sold insurance;
securities firms underwrote, sold, and made markets in securities; etc.
Though there were exceptions - e.g., some large urban banks did
both banking and securities activities - this general pattern
prevailed. This pattern was inherited from the British financial
services sector, and was sometimes reinforced by state and/or federal
regulation.
Further, in eras when telecommunications were wholly absent
or relatively primitive, much of financial dealings tended to be local
in nature. Proximity of the parties involved in financial transactions
followed from two essential features of finance: (a) the unavoidable
delay between the act of lending (or investing or making an insurance
commitment) and the act of repayment; and (b) the asymmetry of
3 A longer discussion of the historical sweep can be found in Bernard Shull,
The Origins of Antitrust Banking: An Historical Perspective, 41 Antitrust Bull. 255, 258
1996).
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information between borrower and lender as to the former's pre-loan
repayment probabilities and post-loan (but pre-repayment) behaviors.
With proximity, the lender could "size up" and reassure itself as to
the creditworthiness of a potential borrower and then monitor the
borrower's activities during the term of the loan; similarly, the
potential borrower could present its best case to the lender. With the
large geographic size and scattered population of the U.S., proximity
implied that there would be large numbers of relatively small
enterprises offering financial services of many kinds. State and
federal regulation often reinforced this tendency.
Populist sentiments, with fears of the economic/social/political
powers of financial institutions and their owners, favored keeping
financial institutions small, dispersed, and locally focused. For
example, most states restricted or entirely prohibited bank branching; in
"unit banking" states such as Illinois and Texas, the prohibition on
branching meant a proliferation of small single-location states spread
throughout the state.4 And all states prohibited branching across state
lines. Thus, the U.S. in the late nineteenth century was a country that
had tens of thousands financial services firms of various kinds scattered
across the landscape.
After the turn of the century the processes of financial
consolidation began. The improved telecommunications of the
telephone and the telegraph meant that financial services firms could do
more things over wider areas and longer distances. The most notable
beneficiary was the securities industry. Relatively unencumbered by
regulation at any level, securities exchanges centered on a few large
cities, with New York clearly pre-eminent. The major stock brokerage
"wire houses" spread their networks of retail distribution branch office
broadly across the country. Banking also showed some signs of
consolidation: the number of commercial banks peaked at 30,456 in
1920 and then fell to 24,970 by 1929.
The stock market crash of 1929 and the severe decline in
economic activity that followed from 1929-1933, produced a wave of
4 By contrast, there were some states, such as California, that permitted
unlimited branching within their borders. And there were others, such as New York, that
permitted a limited amount of branching, but confined the branching to defined
geographic areas within the state.
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federal legislation that extended the federal government's regulatory
powers in many directions; the financial services sector was
prominent. Heightened federal regulation of banks and savings
institutions encompassed stringent safety-and-soundness regulation,
restrictions on entry, and ceilings on the interest rates that banks could
pay to their depositors. The securities industry (and the publicly
traded companies that issued them) was blanketed with extensive
disclosure and investor safety requirements. Due to concerns that the
securities activities of commercial banks had somehow contributed to
the stock market crash and the wave of bank failures that followed,
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited commercial banks from
engaging in most securities activities. The Act also prohibited
securities firms from owning commercial banks, thus strengthening
the functional compartmentalization of American finance.
Further compartmentalization was imposed by the Bank
Holding Company Acts of 1956 and 1970. Commercial banks were
generally restricted to activities that were closely related to traditional
banking. As such, the banks were prohibited from owning insurance
companies and non-financial enterprises.
5
The last major piece of regulatory legislation of this type was
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. The CRA was a response
to beliefs that some banks and savings institutions were "red lining"
some low income communities and simply not lending to any
borrowers in such communities. The Act imposed an obligation on
banks and savings institutions "to meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institutions. 6
5 As the names of these acts imply, these restrictions also applied to the bank
holding companies that were becoming an increasingly common ownership structure for
banks.
6 See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1977)
("CRA").
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B. The Reasons for the Trends.
We are now in a position to discuss the reasons underlying the
trends described in Table 3. At base, the most important reasons are
the dramatic and continuing improvements in data processing and
telecommunications technologies, which are the core technologies for
the provision of financial services. These improvements permit
financial services to be offered over longer distances and in larger
combinations. Simultaneously, there has been a deregulation
movement that, since the early 1970s, has meant a loosening of
governmental regulation in a number of industries,7 including
financial services. The dramatic technological improvements and the
deregulation efforts have been symbiotic, at least for banks. Many
bank managements wanted to take advantage of the wider capabilities
that the improved technologies gave them; the reductions in
regulatory barriers provided them with wider opportunities to take
advantage of the expanded capabilities. But, the improved
technologies and looser restrictions have also increasingly permitted
non-banks to encroach on the services that were the preserve of banks
in earlier decades.
The deregulation of financial services began in the early 1970s
with the end of government-blessed fixed commission rates for stock
brokerage transactions; this culminated in the "May Day" (July 1, 1975)
freeing-up of all commission rates. Also in the 1970s some states eased
their restrictions on intra-state bank branching, and by the late 1970s
some states had begun negotiating and entering mutual compacts that
permitted reciprocal bank entry across state lines. These efforts
continued through the 1980s, and finally culminated in 1994 federal
legislation (the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act) that explicitly permitted interstate branching.
Beginning in the mid 1970s, sharp-eyed lawyers began finding
"loop-holes" in the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions, and banks began
slowly moving into the securities business, starting first with discount
brokerage. Also, interest rate controls on most deposits were
7 These include airlines, railroads, trucking, telecommunications, natural gas,
and petroleum.
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eliminated in the early 1980s, allowing market forces to determine
rates. In the late 1980s banks began limited entry into securities
underwriting and expanded those efforts in the 1990s. Federal
regulators were generally sympathetic to banks' desires to expand into
securities activities and indeed were broadly sympathetic to banks'
desires to expand the general scope of their activities - over the
opposition of other financial services providers, such as securities
firms and insurance companies. Finally, after over two decades of
trying to pass legislation that would formally rescind the Glass-
Steagall barriers, but finding itself deadlocked by conflicting interest
groups, the Congress succeeded in passing the GLB Act in late 1999.8
III. THE IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES
The impacts of financial modernization - both the longer
trends and the GLB Act itself - are straightforward. Consolidation
clearly means that there will be fewer locally based financial
institutions. Localism will be reduced, especially in rural areas and
small towns. But the improved technologies will mean that for many
financial services most consumers will have wider choices.
Telephones, automated teller machines (ATMs), and most recently
the Internet will allow financial services firms, that are headquartered
elsewhere, to have local branch offices or to conduct their transactions
through the mail, the telephone, or the Internet. These methods are
now standard for many financial services transactions.
9
8 This overall sweep of deregulation has not been uniform. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, in response to the debacle of the insolvency and failure of thousands of
savings institutions and banks, Congress passed legislation that considerably tightened
the safety-and-soundness regulatory procedures that applied to depository institutions.
See Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift
Regulation (1991); see also Lawrence J. White, Bank Regulation in the United States:
Understanding the Lessons of the 1980s and 1990s, in Japan And The World Economy
(forthcoming 2001 ).
9 Examples include securities transactions, mutual fund transactions, loan
applications, and deposit and withdrawal activities.
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Another potential trend, though still nascent, will be a
tendency for financial services firms to offer bundles of services.
How extensive the bundles will be, and how receptive consumers will
be to the bundles, are still open questions. The Citigroup
"experiment" - the bundling of a commercial bank, a securities firm,
and an insurance company; all under one corporate roof; and all
providing products and services that can be "cross-sold" to customers
- is just that. If successful, this bundling will mean that users of
financial services will be able to do more "one stop shopping."
However, though the GLB Act has legitimized this experiment, there
have been few other banks that have proceeded much beyond the
inclusion of a securities firm and the offering of mutual funds as part
of their packages of services.'°
As was discussed in the previous section, these tendencies
toward consolidation had been present well before the passage of the
GLB Act. The forces of technological change, accompanied by the
rolling back of earlier regulatory restraints, have been potent. These
trends surely would have continued even in the absence of GLB. But,
GLB will provide a public policy nudge that is likely to accelerate
them modestly.
As a consequence, though users of financial services may
have physical or personal contact with fewer locally headquartered
providers, they will surely have access to a far larger array of financial
services that are offered by a larger number of electronically1 1
accessible firms. Though those firms will be fewer and larger than
was true even a decade ago, there will still be thousands of them.
However, where a local presence seems to be important for
competitive reasons - for example, in the provision of bank deposits,
and in the provision of loans to small and medium size enterprises -
vigilant antitrust enforcement will be necessary to ensure that mergers
do not create positions of local
market power. 2
10 And it is worth noting that efforts in the past to provide a broad array of
financial services under one corporate roof, notably by American Express and by Sears,
were not successful.
" Or by mail or telephone.
12 For example, for bank mergers that involve overlapping branch structures
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Also, the public purposes served by the safety-and-soundness
regulatory restraints on banks and other depositories, on insurance
companies, and on defined-benefit pension plans remain as valid in
the new world of financial modernization as they have in the past.
The more complicated nature of modem financial services firms may
make these regulatory tasks somewhat more complicated. But
modem regulators should be capable of handling these burdens.
In sum, the overall effects of financial consolidation - so
long as antitrust enforcement and safety-and-soundness regulation
remain vigorous - will generally be positive for the users of financial
services.
IV. WHAT ABOUT THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT?
The GLB Act contained a few provisions that, arguably,
weakened the CRA. The regulatory examinations for smaller banks
and savings institutions (with assets under $250 million) will occur
less often for institutions whose last examination ratings were deemed
"outstanding" or "satisfactory". The smaller institutions' argument
was that they are community-oriented anyway and therefore the
examinations have been largely a waste of time, effort, and money,
especially for institutions that have performed well in the past. Also,
agreements between financial institutions and community groups in
connection with fulfillment of CRA obligations must be revealed, and
there are annual reporting requirements on groups in connection with
funds received in connection with such agreements. The proponents
of this provision argued that some community groups were extracting
"ransom" from banks, especially at the times of mergers (when CRA
performance is especially scrutinized), and that "sunshine" should be
applied to these arrangements.
Unfortunately, the entire CRA effort - though well
in communities where bank branches are few, the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division routinely requires that the merging banks spin or sell off sufficient branches in
the communities so as to maintain adequate local competition.
20001 123
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVII
intentioned - is a misguided one.' 3 It is a throwback to the simpler
era of localized banks and savings institutions. The CRA also
assumes that banks are, in essence, local public utilities that have
monopoly power and earn monopoly rents and that some of these
rents can be forced back into the community. It is a localist
anachronism in the wider and more competitive financial world of the
twenty-first century.
The flaw of the CRA can be simply stated: Banks earn their
profits by making loans and providing other financial services to their
customers in the best way that they can. If a loan or a service is
perceived to be profitable, the bank will try to provide it; if not, then
not. In this light, either the CRA is redundant (the bank will make the
loans and provide the services anyway); or it is a requirement that the
bank should make loans that it does not find profitable and somehow
cover those losses - to cross-subsidize - with excess profits from
other activities.
Perhaps, in earlier decades the local public utility model for
banking was closer to reality. And perhaps in this protected and
comfortable world some banks were passing up potentially profitable
opportunities; and perhaps the CRA at that time could have spurred
banks to take actions that they were overlooking. But those days have
long since passed.
Instead, in the increasingly competitive world of financial
services, excess profits are less likely to appear, and the opportunities
for cross-subsidization diminish accordingly. Further, the localist
orientation of the CRA is truly anachronistic in an era when the
physical location of the provider of financial services is decreasing in
importance. And the CRA may well have unintended negative
consequences: Banks may be reluctant to establish a local presence in
an area to provide any financial services if they believe that they may
subsequently be obligated to provided services that they see as
unprofitable.
The informal system of implicit pressures that the CRA places
13 For an extended version of my views, see Lawrence J. White, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20
FORDAM URB. L.J. 281 (1993).
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on banks should be replaced with a formal system that relies on public
subsidies for the financing of projects that cannot be financed through
normal commercial channels, but serve an appropriate public purpose.
Projects that can be justified to serve public purposes should properly
be supported through the public fisc.
Further, to the extent that racial or other types of personal
discrimination in lending is perceived to be the problem, more
vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws - notably, the
Equal Opportunity Credit Act of 1975 - is a better way to proceed.
This approach has the double advantage of being more direct in
addressing the problem and of covering all lenders of all kinds, not
just banks and savings institutions that are covered by the CRA.
CONCLUSION
Financial modernization - both in its broad interpretation
and in the guise of the GLB Act - will generally be beneficial for
communities and their residents. The Act ought to be welcomed as
part of the process by which the forces of technological change and
improve the efficiency and productivity of the U.S. economy.
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TABLE 1: THE SECTORS, AND THEIR SIZES
($billions, assets year-end 1999)
Commercial banks $5,735
Savings institutions $1,149
Credit unions $425
Life insurance companies $3,150
Other insurance companies
(property/casualty) $891
Mutual funds $6,846
Equity & bond funds $5,233
Money market funds $1,613
Securities brokers & dealers $999
Finance companies $956
Pension funds:
Private $4,998
State & local governments $3,047
Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) $1,720
Government sponsored MBS $2,292
Trade credit $1,928
Market value, equity shares $18,877
U.S. GDP $9,255
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TABLE 2: NUMBERS OF FIRMS
(1999, approximate)
Commercial banks 8,580
Commercial bank organizations 6,600
Savings institutions 1,640
Credit unions 11,016
Insurance companies 3,600
Insurance organizations 1,600
Mutual funds:
Number of funds 7,791
Equity & bond 6,746
Money market 1,045
Number of companies 434
Finance companies n.a.
Securities firms 7,700
Number of listed companies
(publicly traded) 10,000
Number of enterprises in the U.S. 22,000,000
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TABLE 3: RECENT TRENDS, AND SOME LONGER-TERM TRENDS
Relative growth of financial sector:
%of GDP, 1970 4.0%
%of GDP, 1998 7.7%
Consolidation:
# of commercial banks, 1985 14,423
# of commercial banks with assets > $ 1OB, 1985 27
% of all bank assets in banks with assets > $ JOB, 1985 34.7%
# of commercial banks, 1999 8,580
# of commercial banks with assets > $ IOB, 1999 76
% of all bank assets in banks with assets > $ IOB, 1999 66.6%
Recent health of U.S. banks:
# of banks closed, 1989 207
(loss = $6.2B)
# of banks closed, 1999 7
(loss = $0.8B)
Globalization:
% of U.S. bank assets held by non-U.S. banks, 1973 3.8%
% of U.S. bank assets held by non-U.S. banks, 1999 19.0%
Reduced regulation
More competition
More electronic banking:
Daily Fedwire transfers, 1989 $727B
Daily Fedwire transfers, 1999 $1,363B
But slow retail growth; 65 billion checks written in 1999!
Rapid rise in the use of the Internet for stock trading
Long-term decline in the relative importance of banks
